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Client-Lawyer Confidentiality
William D. Popkin*
I. Introduction
A professional code of ethics for lawyers serves two major pur-
poses. First, it implements society's interest in the client-lawyer rela-
tionship by encouraging the distribution of legal services,' and by
encouraging or tempering the lawyer's zeal for the client,2 depending
on the circumstances. Second, a professional code protects the client
when the client is unable to protect himself.3 Complex ethical
problems arise whenever these purposes conflict, and it becomes diffi-
cult to define and weigh the interests involved. The dispute over law-
yer advertising and soliciting is a good example. Earlier rules
prohibiting advertising and soliciting prevented lawyers from over-
reaching clients and stirring up litigation, but also discouraged the dis-
tribution of legal services. As public concern for access to legal services
increased, many of the prophylactic rules against advertising and solic-
iting gave way to case-by-case determinations of abuse.4
Designing a code is further complicated by the proliferation of
roles played by lawyers. The lawyer is no longer just the courtroom
advocate hired by the client to appear in adversary proceedings, famil-
iar in the earlier Canons of Ethics.5 Departures from that model-
which was never a completely accurate picture of reality-have in-
creased dramatically in recent years. The lawyer now engages in pre-
trial settlement, appears before administrative tribunals in
nonadversary disputes, issues opinions to clients for dissemination to
* Professor of Law, Indiana University (Bloomington). I am grateful to my colleagues,
Bryant Garth and Lee Teitelbaum, for criticizing an earlier draft of this Article.
1. See, eg., ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY ECs 2-25, 4-1 (1980) [hereinafter
cited as CODE]. See also AsS'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, TOWARD A
MANDATORY CONTRIBUTION OF PUBLIC SERVICE PRACTICE BY EVERY LAWYER, RECOMMENDA-
TIONS AND REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE LAWYER'S PRO BONO OBLIGATIONS
(undated).
2. See, eg., CODE Canon 7, DR 7-102, -106 (1980).
3. Weckstein, Trainingfor Professionalism, 4 CONN. L. REV. 409, 414 (1972). But see Mor-
gan, Yhe Evolving Concept ofqProfessionalResponsibility, 90 HARv. L. REV. 702, 704, 707-39 (1977)
(Code of Professional Responsibility serves the lawyer's interests).
4. The history of amendments to the Code in response to Supreme Court decisions on ad-
vertising and solicitation is described in The Supreme Court, 1977 Term, 92 HARv. L. REV. 185,
195 n.59 (1978).
5. McCoy, The Canons ofEthics: A Reapprairal by the Organized Bar, 43 A.B.A. J. 38, 39-40
(1957).
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nonclients, negotiates contracts, argues for legislation and administra-
tive rules, and represents classes of litigants in test cases, often in situa-
tions where the client does not pay the fee.
This variety of roles has several implications for a professional
code. First, it complicates the drafter's task because the weights at-
tached to interests may vary in different settings, a fact that has always
been explicitly recognized in drafting special rules applicable to prose-
cutors and criminal defense counsel.6 Second, it calls into question the
ability of the bar or the highest court of.the state7 to adopt rules for
situations far removed from the adversary courtroom setting with
which they are most familiar. Third, the variety of roles psychologi-
cally complicates the lawyer's effort to comply. Lawyers may be good
at advising clients to conform to rules in different legal environments,
but they may not find it easy to govern their own professional lives
when confronted with ethical requirements that change with the insti-
tutional setting in which the lawyer operates.
The proliferation of lawyers' roles combined with the shift in the
evaluation of interests that shape a professional code to lead to the cre-
ation of the ABA Commission on Evaluation of Professional Stand-
ards. The commission issued a Discussion Draft8 and then a proposed
Final Draft9 of Model Rules of Professional Conduct barely ten years
after the Code of Professional Responsibility replaced the earlier Ca-
nons of Professional Ethics.'0 The Model Rules of Professional Con-
duct are structured explicitly to account for the various roles played by
lawyersI and to alter the existing balance between the lawyer's obliga-
6. See ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO
THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND THE DEFENSE FUNCTION (1971). See also CODE DR 7-103(B)
(government lawyer in criminal litigation must disclose relevant facts).
7. In all jurisdictions the bar, the highest court of the state, or both are exclusively responsi-
ble for adopting a professional code for lawyers. Report ofthe Special Committee to Secure Adop-
tion of the Code of Professional Responsibility, 97 A.B.A. REP. 268 (1972).
8. ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (Discussion Draft Jan. 1980) [hereinaf-
ter cited as MODEL RULES DISCUSSION DRAFT].
9. ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (Proposed Final Draft May 1981)
[hereinafter cited as MODEL RULES FINAL DRAFT]. Unless otherwise indicated, textual references
to "Model Rules" will be to the Final Draft.
10. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (1908).
11. The Model Rules Discussion Draft is divided into Part A (The Practice of Law) and Part
B (The Responsibilities of a Public Profession). Part A has seven sections, five of which deal
separately with different lawyer roles: § 2 (Adviser), § 3 (Advocate), § 4 (Negotiator), § 5 (Inter-
mediary), § 6 (Legal Evaluator). Section 3 is further divided to deal specially with ex parte pro-
ceedings (Rule 3.5), unrepresented opponents (Rule 3.6), prosecutors (Rule 3.10), defense counsel
(Rule 3.11), and advocacy in nonadjudicative proceedings (Rule 3.12).
The Model Rules Final Draft is not subdivided into parts, and explicit references to lawyer
roles have been reduced. See § 2 (Counselor), § 3 (Advocate), § 4 (Transactions with Persons
Other Than Clients). Section 2 is further divided into Advisor (Rule 2.1), Intermediary (Rule 2.2),
and Evaluation for Use by Third Persons (Rule 2.3). Section 3 refers to the Prosecutor (Rule 3.8)
756
Vol. 59:755, 1981
Confidentiality
tions to the client and the public interest.12
This Article is concerned with one area of ethical responsibility
addressed by the Model Rules: the obligation to preserve or disclose
the client's confidences.' 3 Part II compares how existing Code provi-
sions and both versions of the Model Rules deal with disclosure
problems in a variety of settings. Part III critically evaluates the rea-
sons that might support the changes made by the Model Rules. Part IV
explores the limits of a generally applicable code of professional con-
duct by analyzing the problems of disclosure in tax disputes.
II. Client Confidentiality Under the Existing Code and the Model
Rules: A Modest Shift Toward Greater Disclosure
Even without a careful analysis of the Model Rules the reader
could anticipate, simply from the change in formal placement of the
confidentiality rules, that the lawyer's obligation has shifted towards
greater disclosure of client confidences. Preservation of client confi-
dences is the fourth axiomatic norm in the current Code.14 The Model
Rules, which do not set forth the axiomatic norms of the present Code,
place the disclosure provisions sixth in the section dealing with the cli-
ent-lawyer relationship. 15
and to the Advocate in Nonadjudicative Proceedings (Rule 3.9). Rule 4.3 is entitled "Dealing
with Unrepresented Persons."
The drafters of the Model Rules issued a Final Alternative Draft that follows the format of
the current Code. See ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (Alternative Draft May
1981) [hereinafter cited as MODEL RULES ALTERNATIVE DRAFT]. Considerable controversy had
arisen over the format of the Discussion Draft, which fashioned rules according to the various
roles played by lawyers. See supra. Compare MODEL RULES DISCUSSION DRAFT Table of Con-
tents with NATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF BAR COUNSEL, REPORT ON A STUDY OF THE PROPOSED
ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT WITH RECOMMENDATIONS 2-5 (1980). No sub-
stantive differences between the Model Rules Alternative Draft and the Model Rules Final Draft
were intended. Rules relating to confidentiality are found in the Alternative Draft in Disciplinary
Rules 4 and 7. See MODEL RULES ALTERNATIVE DRAFT DR 4-101; id. DRs 7-102(A), (D), (F).
12. For example, zealousness for the client has been replaced with diligence. Compare CODE
Canon 7 with MODEL RULES FINAL DRAFT Rule 1.3. See also text accompanying notes 14-88
inf a.
13. The proposals concerning disclosure already have aroused intense controversy. See Red-
lich, Disclosure Provisions of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RE-
SEARCH J. 981; White, Machia yelli and the Bar: Ethical Limitations on Lying in Negotiation, 1980
AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 926; Wolfram, Client Perjury: The Kutak Commission andtheAssoci-
ation of Trial Lawyers on Lawyers, Lying Clients, and the Adversary System, 1980 AM. B. FOUND.
RESEARCH J. 964.
14. CODE Canon 4. The term "axiomatic norm" appears in the Code's preliminary state-
ment. CODE Preliminary Statement, at 1.
15. See MODEL RULES FINAL DRAFT Rule 1.6. By contrast, the discussion draft of the
American Trial Lawyer's Code of Conduct self-consciously puts confidentiality as the lawyer's
first obligation. RoscoE POUND-AMERICAN TRIAL LAWYERS FOUNDATION, THE AMERICAN
LAWYER'S CODE OF CONDUCT Introduction, at v-vi; id. § 1, at 101-10 (Discussion Draft June
1980) [hereinafter cited as AMERICAN LAWYER'S CODE].
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A. A Comparison of Current Code Provisions, the Model Rules
Discussion Draft, and the Model Rules Final Draft
Form mirrors substance, as the following catalogue of variations
among the Code and the two versions of the Model Rules illustrates.
The relatively radical increases in disclosure of client confidences sug-
gested in the Discussion Draft of the Model Rules 16 have been substan-
tially limited in the final version of the proposed Rules, although some
vestiges of the shift toward increased disclosure remain. 17 The follow-
ing paragraphs point out specific differences between the two drafts,
and subpart II(B) discusses the reasons for the Final Draft's retreat
from disclosure.
1. Criminal or Fraudulent Acts by the Client.-Although the Dis-
cussion Draft permitted disclosure of client confidences to prevent the
consequences of "deliberately wrongful acts" by the client,18 the Final
Draft allows discretionary disclosure to prevent "criminal or fraudulent
act[s] . . likely to result in substantial injury to the financial interest
or property of another" or to "rectify the consequences of [such acts] in
the commission of which the lawyer's services had been used."'19
For example, the client, the majority owner of a corporation, con-
sults the lawyer about buying out the minority shareholders. During
the discussion it becomes clear that the client wants to be rid of the
minority owners because he fears discovery that he improperly with-
drew money from the corporation to pay personal debts. The lawyer
determines that the withdrawal was clearly illegal and advises the client
to return the money. The client refuses to return the money.
The Final Draft prohibits the lawyer from disclosing confidences
to rectify the consequences of thispast wrongful act by the client, un-
less the lawyer's services had been used in the commission of the act.20
The Discussion Draft allowed disclosure in this situation, regardless of
the lawyer's involvement in the past wrongful act. 21
Existing rules can be charitably described only as unclear. The
closest analogue to the Model Rules in the Code permits disclosure to
prevent a crime and requires application of the vague notion of a "con-
16. See, e.g., notes 42-43 infra & accompanying text.
17. See, e.g., text accompanying note 88 infra.
18. MODEL RULES DISCUSSION DRAFT Rule 1.7(c)(2). The Discussion Draft exempted dis-
closure when the lawyer was employed after the commission of such an act to represent the client
concerning the act or its consequences. Id.
19. MODEL RULES FINAL DRAFT Rule 1.6(b)(2), (3).
20. See id.
21. See note 18 supra & accompanying text.
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tinuing crime." 22 ABA Ethics Committee opinions add to the confu-
sion by sometimes requiring23 and sometimes prohibiting24 disclosure
to prevent crimes. The contradictions in the ABA opinions25 are com-
pounded by their uncertain relevance under the present Code. They
interpreted the prior Canons, and their citation in footnotes to the cur-
rent Code26 is not supposed to be authoritative,27 but at least one ABA
informal opinion indicates that the earlier opinions are still valid inter-
pretations of the Code.28 Moreover, the ABA opinions deal with dis-
closure in the case of fugitives from justice,29 a situation in which
disclosure obligations might be greater because the court's jurisdiction
has already attached. 30
The Discussion Draft eliminated these ambiguities by clearly per-
mitting disclosure and by defining the occasion for allowing disclosure
as the prevention of harm resulting from wrongdoing, not the act of
wrongdoing itself.3' The Final Draft prohibits disclosure concerning
prior acts by the client, except when the lawyer's services are used in
the commission of the act, and shifts the focus back to the prevention of
the act itself, not the prevention of the act's harmful consequences.3 2
22. CODE DR 4-I1O(C)(3). Dike v. Dike, 75 Wash. 2d 1, 14, 448 P.2d 490, 498 (1968) (attor-
ney must reveal whereabouts of client to prevent the continuing wrong of child-snatching); ABA
COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 156, at 427 (1936); id. No. 155, at 426 (1936)
[hereinafter cited as ABA FORMAL OPINIONS]; ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, INFOR-
MAL OPINIONS, No. 1141, at 355 (1970) [hereinafter cited as ABA INFORMAL OPINIONS]. See also
G. HAZARD, ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 25-31 (1978); Note, The Future Crime of Tort
Exception to Communications Privileges, 77 HARV. L. REV. 730 (1964).
23. ABA FORMAL OPINIONS Nos. 156 (1936), 155 (1936); ABA INFORMAL OPINIONS No.
1141 (1970).
24. ABA FORMAL OPINIONS No. 23 (1930).
25. State ethics committees also seem to reach contradictory results. See Callan & David,
Professional Resaponsibility and the Duty of Confidentiality: Disclosure of Client Misconduct in an
Adversary System, 29 RUTGERS L. REv. 332, 355 n.103 (1976).
26. Eg., CODE DR 4-101(C)(3), at n.16 (citing ABA FORMAL OPINIONS Nos. 314 (1965), 155
(1936)).
27. The Code's Preamble states that the footnotes are not the views of the committee that
drafted the text of the Code. CODE Preamble, at n.l.
28. ABA INFORMAL OPINIONS No. 1141, at 355-56 (1970).
29. Two ABA Opinions deal with clients free on bail, ABA FORMAL OPINIONS Nos. 155
(1936), 23 (1930), one with a client on probation, id. No. 156 (1936), and one with a client who was
a military deserter, ABA INFORMAL OPINIONS No. 1141 (1970).
30. AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, ANNOTATED CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
179 (1979). It is also possible that these ABA opinions are meant to apply the mandate that
lawyers disclose confidences when "required by law," rather than when a crime can be prevented.
See CODE DR 7-102(A)(3); id. DR 4-101(C)(2), at n.15 (citing ABA FORMAL OPINIONS Nos. 156
(1936), 155 (1936)). See note 33 infra (concerning disclosure "required by law").
31. See note 18 supra & accompanying text.
32. See MODEL RULES FINAL DRAFT Rule 1.6(b)(2). Rule 1.6(b)(3) is the only part of the
final version of the Rules that focuses explicitly on the consequences of wrongful client acts. The
rule allows a lawyer to reveal confidential information to the extent necessary "to rectify the
consequences of a client's criminal or fraudulent act in the commission of which the lawyer's
services ha[ve] been used." MODEL RULES FINAL DRAFT Rule 1.6(b)(3). Rule 1.6(b)(2), which is
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Some ambiguity remains in the application of both versions of the
Rules, however, because the standards for exercising discretion are un-
clear.33 For example, the comment to Rule 1.634 cites lawyer involve-
ment in the transaction as one of many factors in determining whether
to disclose, and not as a sufficient condition of disclosure. 35
The Model Rules also would replace the existing rules requiring
disclosure when a client, represented by a lawyer, defrauds another
person.36 Whether fraud overrides client-lawyer confidentiality has
been unclear under the Code.37 The 1969 version of the Code was si-
lent on this point, but a 1974 amendment prevented disclosure of privi-
leged information, despite perpetration of fraud on another person.38
An ABA formal opinion interprets the 1974 amendment to apply to all
the revised version of MODEL RULES DISCUSSION DRAFT Rule 1.7(c)(2), drops the earlier ver-
sion's references to "consequences of a deliberately wrongful act" and focuses simply on the pre-
vention of a criminal or fraudulent act by the client. The new rule does require that the act be one
"that the lawyer believes is likely to result in" harm-a phrase not in the earlier version--so that
the emphasis remains on the prevention of harm caused by the client, though not as explicitly as in
the Discussion Draft.
33. The Model Rules also fail to clarify the uncertainty surrounding disclosure when neces-
sary "to comply with ... other law," except to make clear that failure to disclose violates the
ethical rules. Compare MODEL RULES FINAL DRAFT Rule 1.6(b)(5) (lawyer may disclose infor-
mation to the extent required by law) with CODE DR 4-101(C)(2) (lawyer may reveal information
when permitted under Disciplinary Rules or required by law or court order) and CODE DR 7-
102(A)(3) (lawyer shall not fail to disclose what the law requires to be revealed). See AMERICAN
BAR FOUNDATION, supra note 30, at 173-74. The problem, which persists under the Model Rules,
is to determine whether the "law" requires disclosure. Most existing rulings deal with physical
evidence of a crime, In re Ryder, 263 F. Supp. 360 (E.D. Va.), af'd, 381 F.2d 713, 714 (4th Cir.
1967); Morrell v. State, 575 P.2d 1200, 1211-12 (Alaska 1978); ABA INFORMAL OPINIONS No. 1057
(1968), and compliance with court orders, In re January 1976 Grand Jury, 534 F.2d 719, 729 (7th
Cir. 1976); In re Kerr, 86 Wash. 2d 655, 662 n.2, 548 P.2d 297, 301 n.2 (1976). See Callan &
David, supra note 25, at 357 n.109.
The policies behind disclosure and nondisclosure undoubtedly will influence interpretation of
what the "law" requires. See People v. Beige, 83 Misc. 2d 186, 372 N.Y.S.2d 798, a/j'd, 50 A.D.2d
1088, 376 N.Y.S.2d 771 (1975), aft'd, 41 N.Y.2d 60, 359 N.E.2d 377, 390 N.Y.S.2d 867 (1976).
Moreover, the uncertainty about this requirement will probably mitigate discipline, even if disclo-
sure is required by law. See Dike v. Dike, 75 Wash. 2d 1, 15-16, 448 P.2d 490, 498-99 (1968)
(disclosure required by contempt order vacated because attorney did not have benefit of counsel
and opportunity for review); Note, Professional Responsibility and In re Ryder. Can An Attorney
Serve Two Masters?, 54 VA. L. REv. 145, 181 (1968). Cf. Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449, 468
(1975) (lawyer not subject to contempt penalty for advising client in good faith against producing
incriminating evidence).
34. MODEL RULES FINAL DRAFT Rule 1.6, Comment, at 40.
35. An earlier draft of the Model Rules required lawyer involvement. Kaufman, .4 Critical
First Look at the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 66 A.B.A. J. 1074, 1078 (1980). The final
version does make lawyer involvement a necessary condition in the application of Rule 1.6(b)(3)
regarding disclosure to rectify the consequences of a past criminal or fraudulent act by the client.
MODEL RULES FINAL DRAFT Rule 1.6(b)(3).
36. CODE DR 7-102(B)(1).
37. A. KAUFMAN, PROBLEMS IN PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 146-47, 152 (1976); Callan &
David, supra note 25, at 359-62; Wolfram, Client Perjury, 50 S. CAL. L. REv. 809, 865 (1977).
38. The history of the amendment is explained in Note, Client Fraud and the Lawyer-An
EthicalAnasis, 62 MnN. L. REv. 89, 96-104 (1977). See also ABA FORMAL OPINIONS No. 341
(1975).
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information acquired by the lawyer in a professional relationship,
"secrets" as well as "confidences," whether or not privileged under the
attorney-client privilege.39
The Discussion Draft permitted what the amended prior rule pro-
hibited-applying the standard of permissive disclosure to all deliber-
ately wrongful acts with harmful consequences, including prior
frauds.40 In the Final Draft, however, not all prior frauds are subject to
permissive disclosure to rectify their harmful consequences. Rule
1.6(b)(3) specifies that a lawyer can disclose information only when the
lawyer's services have been used in the commission of the fraudulent
act.4
1
Another area in which the Final Draft retreats from the disclosure
standards suggested in the Discussion Draft is disclosure when neces-
sary to prevent death or serious bodily harm. The Discussion Draft
required, rather than permitted, disclosure of confidences when neces-
sary to prevent the client from committing an act that would result in
death or serious bodily harm to another person.42 The Final Draft
reduces the standard to permissive disclosure,43 allowing discretionary
disclosure regardless of the type of harm anticipated.44
2 Client Fraud upon the Tribunal.--The Model Rules treat client
39. ABA FORMAL OPINIONS No. 341 (1975). The opinion appears to reinstate earlier rulings
against disclosure, such as ABA FORMAL OPINIONS Nos. 23 (1930), 202 (1940), and 274 (1946).
Opinion 341 states that disclosure is still required under the Code if the lawyer discovers the fraud
outside of the professional relationship or if it is required by law, ABA FORMAL OPINIONS No.
341, at 4 (1965), but that does not leave much to disclose. Wolfram, supra note 37, at 820, 836-37
& n.106; Note, supra note 38, at 109-11.
The lawyer, who cannot himself disclose, is required to counsel the client to reveal prior
fraud. ABA INFORMAL OPINIONS No. 1416 (1978). See ABA INFORMAL OPINIONS No. 1318
(1975); Wolfram, supra note 37, at 846.
40. MODEL RULES DISCUSSION DRAFT Rule 1.7(c)(2).
41. MODEL RULES FINAL DRAFT Rule 1.6(b)(3).
42. MODEL RULES DISCUSSION DRAFT Rule 1.7(b). Compare id (disclosure required when
death or serious bodily harm is threatened) with MODEL RULES DISCUSSION DRAFT Rule 1.7(c)(2)
(discretionary disclosure for deliberately wrongful client acts generally). Accord, Callan & David,
supra note 25, at 356 (disclosure should be required when life or safety seriously endangered);
ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE DEFENSE
FUNCTION § 3.7(d) (197 1) (disclosure when life or safety seriously endangered and lawyer believes
disclosure necessary for prevention). By contrast, the American Lawyer's Code would never re-
quire disclosure and would permit disclosure only under certain conditions. AMERICAN LAw-
YER'S CODE § 1, at 101-03. Alternative A would permit disclosure to prevent imminent danger to
human life and bribery or extortion of judge or juror. Id. §§ 1.4-.5, at 101-02.
43. MODEL RULES FINAL DRAFT Rule 1.6(b)(2). The drafters also replaced the objective
language of the earlier version (prevention of an act "that would result in death or serious bodily
harm") with a subjective test (prevention of an act "that the lawyer believes is likely to result in
death or substantial bodily harm"). Compare MODEL RULES DISCUSSION DRAFT Rule 1.7(b) with
MODEL RULES FINAL DRAFT Rule 1.6(b)(2). The final version replaces the phrase "serious bodily
harm" with "substantial bodily harm" and requires that the client's act be criminal or fraudulent.
See MODEL RULES FINAL DRAFT Rule 1.6(b)(2).
44. See notes 18-19 supra & accompanying text.
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misrepresentation in the course of advocacy before a tribunal in the
section on advocacy45 and not in the earlier rules dealing with client
confidences and general client wrongdoing.46 Both versions of the
Model Rules impose the general requirement that a lawyer must take
action to remedy the effect of presenting before a tribunal evidence that
the lawyer comes to know is false, even if this requires disclosure of
information otherwise confidential under Rule 1.6.47 The Discussion
Draft, however, required the lawyer explicitly to disclose the fact that
evidence or testimony offered in the course of representation48 by the
lawyer was false,49 whether or not his intentions in offering it were
fraudulent.50 The Final Draft does not require explicit disclosure of
falsity, but rather requires "reasonable remedial measures."5' The
comment to the Rule, however, indicates that disclosure would gener-
ally be required.5 2
Existing rules are the same as those applicable to fraud upon a
person, which prohibit disclosure if the information is privileged. 53
45. See MODEL RULES FINAL DRAFT Rule 3.3.
46. See MODEL RULES FINAL DRAFT Rule 1.6.
47. See MODEL RULES FINAL DRAFT Rules 3.3(a)(4), 3.3(b); MODEL RULES DISCUSSION
DRAFT Rule 3.1(b).
48. MODEL RULES DISCUSSION DRAFT Rule 3.1(b) does not explicitly state that the false-
hood must be presented "in the course of representation" by the lawyer, compare CODE DR 7-
102(B)(1), but that is its meaning. See MODEL RULES DISCUSSION DRAFT Rule 10.1, Comment,
at 130 (reference to MODEL RULES DISCUSSION DRAFT Rule 3.1 as requiring lawyer involvement).
49. See MODEL RULES DISCUSSION DRAFT Rule 3.1(b).
50. It is arguable that an innocent or negligent client falsehood would not invoke the lawyer's
disclosure obligation. MODEL RULES FINAL DRAFT Rule 3.3, Comment, at 125-26, juxtaposes
falsehood and deception. However, the rules themselves refer only to "false" evidence, in contrast
to the current Code's reference to "fraud," see CODE DR 7-102(B)(1), which has been interpreted
to require scienter or intent to deceive. ABA FORMAL OPINIONS No. 341, at 5 (1975). See also
AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, supra note 30, at 324-25. Some commentators on the Model Rules
illustrate their discussion of disclosure with examples of intentional falsehoods, Redlich, supra
note 13, at 989; White, supra note 13, at 935-36, but do not explicitly equate false and fraudulent
statements. Whether innocent falsehoods should be disclosed is discussed at text accompanying
notes 105-12 infra.
51. See MODEL RULES FINAL DRAFT Rule 3.3(a)(4). Lawyers representing criminal defend-
ants occupy a somewhat different position under the proposed rules. In the Discussion Draft the
rule made an explicit exception for lawyers whose decisions to disclose must be determined ulti-
mately by the criminal defendant's constitutional right to assistance of counsel. See MODEL
RULES DISCUSSION DRAFT Rule 3.1(f). The Final Draft deleted the explicit exception, but in-
serted a caveat which cautions that "constitutional law defining the right to assistance of counsel
in criminal cases may supersede the obligations stated in this rule." MODEL RULES FINAL DRAFT
Rule 3.3. See also Callan & David, supra note 25, at 365-81 (fifth amendment might prevent
disclosure by defense counsel).
52. MODEL RULES FINAL DRAFT Rule 3.3, Comment, at 126.
53. Unless CODE DR 7-102(B)(1) requires disclosure, CODE DR 4-101(B)(I) prohibits it.
ABA FoRMAL OPINIONS No. 341 (1975). See also ABA FORMAL OPINIONS No. 287, at 635-37
(1967). Notwithstanding the Code, there is case law requiring disclosure of past client perjury.
State v. Hoover, 223 Kan. 385, 391-92, 574 P.2d 1377, 1381 (1978) (attorney absolved of charge
that he lied to the court but censured for remaining silent after false testimony by client); Commit-
tee on Professional Ethics & Conduct v. Crary, 245 N.W.2d 298, 306 (Iowa 1976) (dictum forbid-
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The new Rule, therefore, is one of two important instances when the
Model Rules require a lawyer to disclose confidential information that
could not be disclosed under the current Code.54
The Model Rules reject several stopping points along the contin-
uum between full disclosure and complete nondisclosure. For exam-
ple, disclosure does not depend on the scienter of the client in the prior
misrepresentation 55 of fact or on the silence of the lawyer amounting to
corroboration of the prior falsehood.5 6
Rule 3.3 of the Final Draft, however, does make disclosure depend
on whether the false evidence that has been offered is "material." 57
Aside from the materiality requirement, though, disclosure depends
simply on whether the lawyer has come to know that the tribunal was
misled.
The drafters of the Model Rules also rejected the common halfway
house of lawyer withdrawal upon discovery of client perjury. This al-
ternative was popular in some ABA formal opinions58 and recent court
decisions,5 9 but the Model Rules' drafters chose prompt disclosure to
the court as the advocate's proper course.60
3. Disclosure of Evidence to Opposing Party.-The Discussion
Draft allowed a lawyer to disclose to another party evidence favorable
to that party, including evidence acquired from the client during the
attorney-client relationship.6 1 The drafters of the Discussion Draft
considered, but rejected, an even more expansive measure, which re-
ding silence after client falsehood). See also ABA INFORMAL OPINIONS No. 1314 (1975) (lawyer
forewarned of perjury must disclose truth if client lies).
54. The other instance is the rule requiring disclosure of relevant facts to a tribunal in ex
parte proceedings. See notes 66-67 infra & accompanying text.
55. See notes 47-50 supra & accompanying text.
56. The lawyer's corroboration of a falsehood by silence is critical in two ABA opinions.
ABA FORMAL OPINIONS Nos. 314, at 691 (1965); 287, at 637-38 (1953). In both opinions the
alternative to silence is withdrawal rather than disclosure.
57. See MODEL RULES FINAL DRAFT Rule 3.3(a)(4). This version of the rule confirms ear-
lier conclusions that failure to disclose misrepresentations of insignificant facts would be unlikely
to result in discipline. See Wolfram, supra note 37, at 844.
58. E.g., ABA FORMAL OPINIONS No. 287 (1953). Under the rule in Formal Opinion 314,
withdrawal is required only if it does not amount to disclosure. ABA FORMAL OPINIONS No. 314,
at 691 (1965).
59. See Wolfram, supra note 37, at 854-62.
60. See MODEL RULES FINAL DRAFT Rule 3.3, Comment, at 127. The American Lawyer's
Code adopts a different approach. It would permit withdrawal in noncriminal litigation when the
client has knowingly induced lawyer action on the basis of material misrepresentations, unless the
lawyer would be required to make explicit disclosure as a condition of withdrawal. If disclosure
were only an indirect result of withdrawal, the lawyer could withdraw. AMERICAN LAwYER'S
CODE § 6.5, at 601. Withdrawal is not conditioned, however, on continued participation amount-
ing to corroboration. Id., Illustrative Case 6(d), at 605-06.
61. MODEL RULES DISCUSSION DRAFT Rule 3.1(e).
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quired disclosure of evidence that would "probably have a substantial
effect on the determination of a material issue." 62
The Final Draft, however, omits the entire provision, 63 con-
forming to existing rules on this subject, which prohibit disclosure.64
The Final Draft contains a provision, though, that may require disclo-
sure of evidence in certain circumstances. Rule 3.3(a)(1) forbids a law-
yer from failing to disclose a fact when failure to make the disclosure is
the equivalent of making a material misrepresentation. 65
4. Disclosure of Relevant Facts in Ex Pare Proceedings.-The
Discussion Draft and the Final Draft are virtually identical on this sub-
ject. Both require a lawyer to inform the tribunal of all relevant facts
known to the lawyer that should be disclosed to the tribunal.66 The
Final Draft clarifies this by making explicit the relation between disclo-
sure and the objective of informed decisionmaking. 67
5. Disclosure During Negotiation.-While the Discussion Draft
treated negotiation in a separately denominated section, the Final
Draft substitutes a section entitled "Transactions with persons other
than clients. ' 68 Both versions contain a rule that addresses disclosure
of facts to other persons, including those with whom the lawyer is nego-
tiating. The Discussion Draft paralleled the obligation imposed in ad-
versary proceedings by requiring the correction of manifest
misapprehensions of fact resulting from prior representations made by
the client,69 whether or not intentionally fraudulent. 70 The Final Draft,
62. Id. Rule 3.1, Comment, at 63.
63. Compare MODEL RULES DISCUSSION DRAFT Rule 3.1(e) with MODEL RULES FINAL
DRAFT Rule 3.3.
64. CODE DR 4-101(B). However, a prosecutor must disclose significant facts. Id. DR 7-
103(B).
65. MODEL RULES FINAL DRAFT Rule 3.3(a)(1).
66. See MODEL RULES DISCUSSION DRAFT Rule 3.5(b); MODEL RULES FINAL DRAFT Rule
3.3(d).
67. See MODEL RULES FINAL DRAFT Rule 3.3(d).
68. See MODEL RULES FINAL DRAFT Rules 4.1-.4. See generally Rubin, A Causerie on Law-
yer's Ethics in Negotiation, 35 LA. L. REv. 577, 578 (1975).
69. MODEL RULES DISCUSSION DRAFT Rules 3.1(b), 4.2(b)(2). The parallel depends on as-
suming that the lawyer is implicated in a misrepresentation in both cases. In advocacy, the in-
volvement arises from presenting the client's evidence or testimony. Id. Rule 3.1; id. Rule 10.1,
Comment, at 130. In negotiation, the involvement arises because the lawyer necessarily incorpo-
rates the client's prior representations into his own bargaining efforts, whether or not the lawyer
explicitly makes the statements, alludes to them, or was representing the client when the client
made them.
70. There is room for debate whether the Discussion Draft requires disclosure of the client's
misrepresentation. See notes 47-50 supra & accompanying text (similar questions arising in con-
nection with advocacy). The Discussion Draft refers to another party's being "misled," which
might suggest intentional fraud. Nonetheless, the rules refer to "representations" by the client and
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however, limits disclosure to situations in which nondisclosure would
be equivalent to a material misrepresentation by the lawyer.7'
The existing rules, as amended, prohibit disclosure of privileged
information even if the client perpetrated a prior fraud on the opposing
party during negotiations.72 The Model Rules, therefore, expand the
obligation to disclose misrepresentations in the negotiation process.
6. Disclosure During Lobbying.-The Model Rules deal sepa-
rately with the role of the advocate who participates in nonadjudicative
proceedings such as influencing administrative rulemaking and legisla-
tive policymaking.73 Both the Discussion Draft and the Final Draft
require the lawyer to follow the general rules regarding candor of the
advocate toward the tribunal.74 Thus, the lawyer appearing before a
rulemaking body has the same obligations to disclose or remedy false
evidence and the client's misrepresentations as does a lawyer appearing
before a court. The attorney appearing as a lobbyist must take into
account the same considerations discussed above in connection with
the courtroom advocate: proper remedial measures, intentional or un-
intentional falsehoods, and disclosure of perjury.75
B. The Final Draft's Emphasis on Lawyer Involvement in Client
Wrongdoing
As illustrated above, the Final Draft of the Model Rules represents
a more modest shift toward greater disclosure of client confidences
than did the Discussion Draft. One explanation for this seems to be a
reluctance to make the lawyer's role in pursuing the general public in-
terest an ethical responsiblity,76 and a preference to rely on civil or
criminal law to determine when disclosure serves the public good.77
For example, the duty to warn the client of harm to others from a seri-
ous legal wrong has been recast in the Final Draft to emphasize protec-
to resulting "misapprehensions," both of which do not link the falsehood to the client's state of
mind. MODEL RULES DISCUSSION DRAFT Rule 4.2(b), Comment, at 90. Whether innocent mis-
representations should be disclosed is discussed at text accompanying notes 105-12 infra.
71. See MODEL RULES FINAL DRAFT Rule 4.1(b)(1).
72. CODE DR 7-102(B)(l). Privileged information has been interpreted to include "secrets."
See note 38 supra & accompanying text. If the prior fraud were a continuing crime, the lawyer
might be permitted to disclose. See notes 22-30 supra & accompanying text.
73. See MODEL RULES FINAL DRAFT Rule 3.9.
74. Compare MODEL RULES DISCUSSION DRAFT Rule 3.12(b)(2) with MODEL RULES FINAL
DRF.r Rule 3.9.
75. See notes 47-52 supra & accompanying text.
76. See text in paragraph following note 104 infra.
77. MODEL RULES FINAL DRAFt Rule 1.6, Comment, at 38, 46 (prevent harm); id. Rule 2.3,
Comment, at 117 (evaluator's duty).
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tion of the client.78 The drafters apparently adopted the view that
confidentiality encourages prevention of harm by facilitating the law-
yer's ability to counsel proper behavior.79
The changes incorporated in the Final Draft are not unambiguous,
however. First, the lawyer may find it more difficult to avoid disclo-
sure of falsehood in negotiations than might at first appear.80 A lawyer
cannot knowingly fail to disclose when silence is the equivalent of a
material misrepresentation.81 Once a lawyer learns that a prior fact
was falsely represented in negotiations, it may be difficult to continue
to participate in the negotiations and at the same time deny that silence
is not a misrepresentation. Second, the lawyer may be required to dis-
close in order to prevent assisting a client engaged in criminal or fraud-
ulent activity, 2 or to prevent being held to have assisted such conduct
by his silence.8 3 The common theme in these two situations is the Final
Draft's stronger emphasis on protecting the lawyer from the taint of
falsity. The Draft contains numerous examples of this attitude. The
Final Draft places greater emphasis than the Discussion Draft on
prohibiting the lawyer from assisting criminality and fraud;84 it explic-
itly links disclosure of a client's innocent falsehood in the advocacy
setting to preventing the lawyer from providing such assistance;85 and it
revives an earlier draft's conditioning of disclosure to rectify harm on
the lawyer's involvement, however innocent, in the client's criminal or
fraudulent acts.8 6 Whether intended to preserve the public image 6f
the lawyer or the lawyer's self-image, the dominant theme in the Final
78. Compare MODEL RULES DISCUSSION DRAFT Rule 2.4, Comment, at 14 with MODEL
RULES FINAL DRAFT Rule 2.1, Comment, at 110-11. Cf. MODEL RULES FINAL DRAFT Rule 1.13
(clearly specifying that the lawyer for an organization acts solely to further the best interests of the
organization, not to blow the whistle in the public interest).
79. See MODEL RULES FINAL DRAFT Rule 1.6, Comment, at 38. See also Kaufman, Book
Review, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1504, 1512 (1981).
80. See note 100 infra. Partial disclosure in tax shelter opinions, for example, may amount to
a misrepresentation unless further disclosure is made. MODEL RULES FINAL DRAFT Rule 4.1,
Comment, at 164.
81. MODEL RULES FINAL DRAFT Rule 4.1(b)(l), Comment, at 162. See also id. Rule
3.3(a)(1) (failure to disclose can be the equivalent of material misrepresentation).
82. Id. Rule 1.6, Comment, at 39.
83. Id. Rule 1.2(d), Comment, at 13.
84. Id. Rule 1.2(d). The Discussion Draft hinted at this result, see MODEL RULES Discus-
sION DRAFT Rule 1.16(a)(1), (b)(2), but was explicit only as to advice and negotiations. See id.
Rules 2.3(a), 4.3.
85. MODEL RULES FINAL DRAFT Rule 3.3, Comment, at 125-26.
86. Id. Rule 1.6(b)(3), Comment, at 47. See note 35 supra. The effort to distinguish lawyer
and client fraud, see MODEL RULES FINAL DRAFT Rule 4.1, Comment, at 162-63, will be difficult
to sustain. See id. Rule 1.6, Comment, at 39 (equating the lawyer's fraud under Rule 3.3(a)(4)
with assisting the client's fraud under Rule 1.2(d)). See also id. Rule 1.6, Comment, at 47
(mandatory disclosure required by Rules 1.2(d), 3.3(a) and 4.1 when the lawyer's conduct is inex-
tricably bound to client misconduct).
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Draft is avoiding the appearance of lawyer involvement in client
wrongdoing.
III. Confidentiality vs. Disclosure: The Relevant Factors
Despite stopping short of mandating disclosure of material facts,87
and despite some lack of clarity concerning the criteria for permissive
disclosure, 88 the Final Draft of the Model Rules alters, in the direction
of greater disclosure, the emphasis in the existing Code on preserving
confidences. Although we should not expect complete agreement on
the philosophy supporting this shift, the specific provisions in the
Model Rules nonetheless reflect an underlying view about the nature of
lawyering and the legal system. This section addresses these broader
philosophical issues.
.4 Social Values Client Protection vs. Informed Decisionmaking
The core of the dispute over confidentiality is whether informed
decisionmaking or client protection is the major objective of legal rep-
resentation.8 9 The usual assumption that confidentiality results in cli-
ent protection rests on the theory that clients will speak more freely
with lawyers90 and thus obtain more effective protection from their ad-
versaries through the legal system.91 The decision to prohibit, permit,
or require disclosure depends on how strongly we value this use of the
legal system.
. Conidentiality and Client Protection.-Commitment to client
87. See text accompanying notes 61-65 supra.
88. See text accompanying notes 33-35 supra.
89. The best known recent disputants are Frankel (for disclosure) and Freedman (against
disclosure). See Frankel, The Search for Trut& An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1031
(1975); M. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 27 (1975); Freedman, Judge
Frankel's Searchfor Truth, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1060 (1975); Freedman, Professional Responsibility
ofthe Criminal Defense Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1469 (1966). A
famous nineteenth century advocate ofdisclosure was Jeremy Bentham. VII J. BENTHAM, RATIO-
NALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 473 (Bowring ed. 1962). His views were challenged by Judge Shars-
wood. D. MELLINKOFF, THE CONSCIENCE OF A LAWYER 174-75 (1973). See also id. at 189 (Lord
Brougham's famous dictum "that an advocate, in the discharge of his duty, knows but one person
in all the world, and that person is his client").
90. See VIII J. WIOMORE, EVIDENCE § 2291, at 545 (1961); CODE EC 4-1; MODEL RULES
DIscuSsIoN DRAFT Rule 1.7, Comment, at 6.
91. To my knowledge, there is no empirical research supporting or rejecting these assump-
tions. We cannot be completely sure that confidentiality is important either in encouraging use of
lawyers or in helping the representative protect the client's rights. The fact that consultation with
nonlawyers is common in such areas as tax law, even though the attorney-client privilege is inap-
plicable, does not demonstrate the irrelevance of confidentiality, because disclosure by nonlawyers
may be very unusual and clients may be under the impression that their communications are
confidential. See notes 134, 139 & 145 infra (discussing the accountant's disclosure obligation).
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confidentiality varies according to two different concepts of the legal
dispute. One concept envisions two adversaries who enter the legal
battle on an unequal footing--one party is politically or institutionally
at a disadvantage. Decisions about confidentiality depend on whether
a client needs protection from the opponent or is instead the one who
dominates the decisionmaking process. For example, the criminal de-
fendant obviously benefits from a decision that he needs protection
from his party-opponent-the government. 92 Similarly, the American
Trial Lawyers Foundation views lawyers as necessary to protect the
client's right to maximize liberty and limit govermment control in civil
as well as criminal cases. 93 Client confidentiality, therefore, is the sum-
mum bonum in its Code of Conduct.94
The difficulty with constructing confidentiality rules on the as-
sumption that clients need protection is that not all clients have the
same need. Assuming that clients uniformly require protection tends to
constitutionalize all decisions about the client-lawyer relationship and
obscure the varying political strengths of different client groups. We
can stop far short of asserting that law and the role of lawyers are mere
reflections of a political struggle95 and still recognize that facilitating a
client's ability to press for legal advantages in the enforcement and in-
terpretation of rules has political implications. This recognition could
lead to confidentiality rules that distinguish the work of the securities
lawyer 96 and tax shelter adviser 97 from representation of the poor98 and
of criminal defendants. 99 In this view, the treatment of the criminal
defendant no longer would be a special exception to a general confi-
dentiality rule, but would become one of many rules reflecting the spe-
cial considerations applicable to each area of the law.
Another less political concept of the legal system sees clients as
neither excessively vulnerable nor particularly powerful. The legal sys-
tem, in this view, has a life of its own, with legal rules developing inde-
92. The attitude toward disclosure is often determined by how dominant the criminal trial
looms in the minds of the commentator. See Freedman, Judge Frankel's Searchfor Truth, supra
note 89, at 1063.
93. AMERICAN LAWYER'S CODE Preamble, at 3-4. Professor Freedman was the Reporter for
the American Lawyer's Code.
94. Id. Introduction, at iii-iv.
95. See, e.g., J. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE 4-5, 11, 307 (1976).
96. See note 174 infra.
97. See notes 167-71 infra & accompanying text.
98. But see M. FREEDMAN, supra note 89, at 20-21.
99. I am not suggesting that clients could ever be deprived of counsel. See United Mine
Workers v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 223 (1967). Nonetheless, restrictions on use of
counsel, such as requiring disclosure of confidences, should be permitted under certain circum-
stances. Cf. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 45-47 (1976) (restrictions on political advocacy permit-
ted to prevent corruption or appearance of corruption).
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pendently of the political power struggle. Confidentiality rules would
not vary according to the political balance of forces prevailing in par-
ticular areas of the law. Also, the commitment to confidentiality would
not be as singleminded if the prototypical client were not considered
the target of an overbearing opponent. If client use of an autonomous
legal system were considered desirable, 10 the confidentiality rules
would stop short of requiring disclosure to a degree that would discour-
age consultation with lawyers. The less political view of the legal sys-
tem, therefore, would produce uniform confidentiality rules that reflect
a balanced view of the need for disclosure.
2 Confidentiality and Informed Decisionmaking.-Efforts to fa-
cilitate legal advice by preserving confidentiality inevitably conflict
with the important value of informed decisionmaking.' 0 l And, the sig-
nificance of this value differs in the contexts of negotiation and
adjudication.
In negotiation, a true and complete set of facts facilitates the per-
sonal autonomy of the negotiators by trusting them to shape their own
destiny in accordance with reality,10 2 insofar as that is possible within
the existing legal system and distribution of wealth. Autonomous judg-
ments, of course, are possible without complete information; there is
little moral significance to such reduced capacity for informed deci-
sionmaking when acquiring facts is excessively costly, just as there is no
moral significance if a natural disaster prevents someone from achiev-
ing a goal. Information known to the other party, however, is not a
natural or costly obstacle to informed judgment. Concealment, there-
fore, has moral implications.103
100. Such use probably would be viewed as desirable because it would encourage peaceful
resolution of disputes, participation in creative judicial rulemaking, and exposure to lawyers who
counsel legality. MODEL RULES DISCUSSION DRAFT Rule 2.4 requires the lawyer to warn clients
if they are likely to commit a legal wrong. Lawyers often have played this role whether required
to or not. See Darrell, Responsibilities ofthe Lawyer in Tax Practice, in PROFESSIONAL RESPONSI-
BILrry IN FEDERAL TAX PRACTICE 87, 101-02 (B. Bittker ed. 1970); AMERICAN LAWYER'S CODE
Introduction, at iv; Paul, The Lawyer as a Tax Adiser, 25 ROCKY MTN. L. REv. 412, 416 (1953).
101. Noonan, The Purpose of Advocacy and the Limits of Confidentiality, 64 MIcH. L. REv.
1485, 1489 (1966). Informed decisionmaking, rather than truth, is a better way to define this
objective because truth ambiguously refers to the final outcome of a dispute as well as to the facts
on which the outcome depends. Uviller, The Advocate, The Truth and Judicial Hackles: A Reac-
tion to Judge Frankel's Idea, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1067, 1071-72 (1975). If an accurate final out-
come is defined as the objective, the way is open to something less than informed decisionmaking
to reach that result, and the lawyer would have too much discretion to substitute his judgement for
that of the tribunal in determining how best to achieve an accurate result. See M. FREEDMAN,
supra note 89, at 30; Noonan, supra at 1489. The discussion in these references concerns destroy-
ing the reliability of truthful witnesses on cross-examination to assure an accurate final result.
102. Cf. S. BoK, LYING 39, 220 (1979) (lying impairs "liberty of judgment").
103. The importance of this loss of autonomy in negotiations might vary depending on what
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True and complete facts are even more important in adjudication.
Not only do they enable parties to make informed settlement offers, but
true and complete facts also allow the application of rules according to
their intent. Toleration of incomplete and untrue facts is, in effect, a
denial of the sovereignty of the legal rules relevant to the dispute.
Advocates of preserving confidences are unwilling to concede that
informed decisionmaking will suffer if disclosure is prohibited. They
see the adversary system not only as the client's protector, but also as a
mechanism for making informed judgments.1°4 Although empirical
data are lacking to support the conclusion, much accurate information
probably is never revealed in legal disputes because parties fail to make
use of discovery and other investigative techniques, fail to ask the right
questions, and fail to be alert to evasive answers.
3. Confidentiality and the Prevention of Harm.-Facilitating legal
advice conflicts with another social value: the prevention of harm from
illegal acts. However, there are good reasons for not elevating this con-
cern to the same level as informed decisionmaking. The seriousness of
harm likely to result from illegal acts varies, and thus the prevention of
harm, unlike informed decisionmaking, is a value not uniformly
shared. Moreover, every time a client divulges past behavior as a pre-
lude to advice from counsel, a significant number of possible legal
harms are likely to come to the lawyer's attention. At its extreme, the
objective of preventing harm conjures up an alarming image of an
open-ended commitment by lawyers to police the legal system.
B. Personal Values-A Lawyer's Ethical Considerations
Confidentiality rules must also depend on the individual lawyer's
ethics, considerations that form the counterpart to the two relevant so-
cial values discussed in subpart III(A).105 In deciding whether to dis-
disclosure would accomplish. If the facts disclosed relate solely to the other party's preferences
for the subject of the negotiations, denial of that information could only affect the distribution of
wealth between the two parties by altering the propensity to hold out for a better bargain. Infor-
mation allowing someone to hold out for a higher price may not be of the same moral significance
as information relevant to determining preferences. It is difficult, however, to categorize facts into
such airtight compartments. Information about the other party's preferences is likely to affect the
value placed on the subject matter of negotiations.
104. AMERIcAN LAWYER'S CODE Preamble, at 5-6. The adversary system may do all that can
be expected of it if it produces an impartial judge, Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint
Conference, 44 A.B.A. J. 11 (1958), even if it does not get high marks for informed
decisionmaking.
105. S. BOK, supra note 102, at 173; Noonan, supra note 101, at 1491; Simon, The Ideology of
Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional Ethics, 1978 Wis. L. REv. 29, 133-34. But see M.
FREEDMAN, supra note 89, at 75-76; Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense
Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, supra note 89, at 1482 n.26.
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close a confidence, a lawyer inevitably will face an ethical conflict. On
the one hand, any professional feels loyalty to a client who has placed
his trust in the professional's expertise. What was once called "honor,"
purged of its aristocratic limitations as a code of behavior for gentle-
men, 0 6 will exert a strong moral pull. t°7 On the other hand, a lawyer's
training commits him to the rule of law, which presupposes the accu-
racy of the facts to which rules are applied. Although likely to be an
agnostic about where ultimate truth lies, the lawyer-perhaps on that
very account-is committed to a process untainted by false or incom-
plete disclosure. 0 8
Ethical concerns will vary with the situations in which the lawyer
becomes a party to uninformed decisionmaking. The lawyer might
knowingly lie; the lawyer might unintentionally fail to disclose material
facts. Between these extremes are numerous variations: fabricated
facts that might result from suggesting legal positions to the client;
knowing use of perjured testimony; cross-examination of a truthful wit-
ness; silence when the lawyer knows of perjury in advance or discovers
it later; and silence after the lawyer becomes aware of prior client mis-
representations innocently made. Disclosure depends on the point at
which the client has forfeited his claim to loyalty; this in turn depends
on what the lawyer defines as central to his ethical role. Once the client
asks the lawyer to depart from that role, his claim on the lawyer's fidel-
ity is broken.
The effect of the individual lawyer's ethics depends on a number
of concerns. First, the lawyer might view his role as centrally bound up
with accuracy. Anything that taints the lawyer with a misrepresenta-
tion, however innocent, would require disclosure. This appeals to the
lawyer's role as guardian of the process by which decisions are made.
Second, the lawyer might limit his concern with the truth to situations
in which the substantive law provides a remedy for the misrepresenta-
106. The attorney-client privilege was originally the lawyer's privilege, on the theory that a
gentleman would not betray a trust. C. McCoRMicK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE
§ 87, at 175 (2d ed. E. Cleary 1972); VIII J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2290, at 543 (1961).
107. Shaffer, Christian Theories of Professional Responsibility, 48 S. CAL. L. REV. 721, 723-30
(1975). If the lawyer loses faith in the client's trustworthiness their future relationship may be
impaired, even if loyalty to the client survives in the current matter. Accountants seem especially
concerned about this problem. Oatway, Motivation and Responsibility in Tax Practice: The Need
for Definition, 20 TAx L. REv. 237, 250 n.19 (1965).
108. The moral significance of full and honest disclosure is different in many interpersonal
relationships than it is in a legal setting. The preservation of mutual trust, which requires honesty,
see S. BOK, supra note 102, at 18-33, is already absent in many legal encounters. The diminished
importance of mutual trust in legal disputes explains the inversion of the usual view that saving a
life is a justification for concealing the truth, which otherwise should be revealed. Id. at 48. The
prospect of saving a life is a reason for violating a confidence and disclosing a truth which other-
wise would remain concealed. MODEL RULES DIScUssIoN DRAFT Rule 1.7(b).
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tion or nondisclosure, either by way of a criminal penalty or civil ac-
tion, such as avoidance of a contract or negligence penalty. This ties
the lawyer's disclosure obligation to the substantive law of misrepre-
sentation and disclosure, and it appeals more to the lawyer's commit-
ment to the substantive law than to the process by which rules are
made. Third, the lawyer might limit disclosure to intentional misrepre-
sentations. Only a limited category of misrepresentations that are sub-
ject to sanction under the substantive law of fraud would so taint the
lawyer that they would have to be disclosed pursuant to the profes-
sional code of ethics. Fourth, concern with substantive law and mis-
representation might combine in a different way to supplement or
replace the third approach: disclosure would be required when the
misrepresented fact is dispositive of a legal obligation. Misrepresenta-
tion of material but nondispositive facts would not have to be disclosed
unless, perhaps, the misrepresentation was intentional. The innocence
of the misrepresentation, however, would not prevent disclosure of a
dispositive fact. The lawyer would thereby avoid involvement with
clear violations of the law, however innocent the misrepresentation.
Fifth, concern with misrepresentation might be limited to the adjudica-
tive setting, on the theory that lawyers are centrally concerned with that
process.
The significance of the ethical dimension of a professional code
should not be underestimated. Warnings about the dangers of disclo-
sure often dwell on the difficulty of imagining a lawyer-client relation-
ship with divided loyalties, 0 9 which suggests not only a social policy
favoring confidentiality, but also a moral discomfort on the part of the
lawyer. Moreover, it is very difficult to understand how some ABA
opinions can urge withdrawal after client perjurylO merely on the basis
of the social values of preserving client confidences or informed deci-
sionmaking, considering that withdrawal will betray the client without
guaranteeing that the truth will emerge."' Instead, withdrawal must
be understood as an attempt to reconcile two ethical obligations, loy-
alty to the client and fidelity to the legal system, by preventing the law-
yer from either disclosing the falsehood or associating himself with
109. See, ag., Uviller, supra note 101, at 1071-72; Kaufman, supra note 35, at 1078.
110. ABA FORMAL OPINIONS Nos. 314 (1965), 287 (1953).
111. The client might get another lawyer from whom the truth will be concealed, M. FREED-
MAN, supra note 89, at 33; Wolfram, supra note 37, at 856-57, or withdrawal might not be permit-
ted. CODE DR 2-1 10(A)(1). Moreover, withdrawal is meaningless if the negotiation or
adjudication is completed.
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C. Considerations of Clarity, Interaction with Substantive Law, and
Effects on Nonlawyer Representation
Three subsidiary issues also influence an ethical code. First, the
rules must be clear enough to provide notice to the lawyer and to ob-
tain an adequate level of voluntary compliance. Requiring disclosure
of innocent misrepresentations, for example, has the advantage of obvi-
ating the need for the lawyer to determine either the client's state of
mind or the substantive law concerning misrepresentations and disclo-
sure. Of course, certainty would also be obtained by severely restrict-
ing,"13 as well as expanding, disclosure.
Second, stricter professional rules of disclosure might affect the
development of other areas of the law. Lawyers might become liable in
tort for nondisclosure of client threats to harm others,1 4 and contrac-
tual obligations might be avoided for failure to disclose innocent mis-
representations." 5  There is no reason, however, to be wary of this
possibility." 6 Substantive law is not bound to follow ethical rules, but
the possibility that it might is a desirable source of creative legal
development.
Third, stricter rules for lawyers might lead clients to rely on other
representatives who are less burdened by disclosure rules. The Model
Rules might even encourage this result because they require the lawyer
to advise the client of any ethical limitations that the client might not
anticipate.117 This fear is probably exaggerated, however. Clients
might not abandon legal counsel and, if they did, the legislature or an
administrative agency might alter the ethical obligations of nonlawyers
in order to conform to the lawyer's code." 8 In any event, that is a risk
which a profession must endure for promulgating ethical rules.' 19
112. Withdrawal is advocated despite lack of authority in the Code. Wolfram, supra note 37,
at 855.
113. See, eg., M. FREEDMAN, supra note 89, at 40-41, 48, 71-73.
114. MODEL RULES DISCUSSION DRAFT Rule 1.7(b). Cf. Tarasoffv. Regents of Univ. of Cal.,
17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976) (duty of psychotherapists to warn potential
victims of their patients).
115. Cf. MODEL RULES DISCUSSION DRAFT Rule 4.2, Comment, at 90 (requiring disclosure of
material facts might affect law on avoidance of transactions on the ground of mistake).
116. See note 33 supra (disclosure policy influences what the "law" requires to be disclosed).
117. MODEL RULES DISCUSSION DRAFT Rule 1.4(b).
118. For example, accountants and lawyers might both be subject to rules imposed by the
Treasury. See note 126 infra.
119. This problem did not bother the drafters of the Model Rules in the lobbying context.
MODEL RULES DISCUSSION DRAFT Rule 3.12, Comment, at 85. Cf. Collie & Marinis, Ethical
Considerations on Discovery of Error in Tax Returns, 22 TAX LAW. 455, 459 (1969).
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D. The Model Rules' Assumptions About the Legal Process and
Institutional Competence
How do the Model Rules fit into this scheme of values? As part II
explained, the Final Draft does not go as far as the Discussion Draft in
requiring disclosure.120 The Final Draft, unlike the Discussion Draft,
does not require disclosure to prevent death or serious bodily harm, or
to correct prior falsehoods made by the client in negotiations (except to
prevent material misrepresentations by the lawyer). The mandatory
disclosure rules of the two drafts are alike only in requiring disclosure
of the fact that material evidence offered by the lawyer to a tribunal
was false1 2' and disclosure of material facts in ex parte proceedings. 122
This reduced but not negligible concern for confidentiality seems
most compatible with the following assumptions. First, clients do not
uniformly require protection from overbearing opponents. Second, the
adversary system cannot be entirely trusted to produce informed
decisionmaking. These two assumptions prevent a singleminded com-
mitment to confidentiality. Third, the law has a life of its own, in-
dependent of political forces. This assumption leads to uniformity of
confidentiality rules without regard to substantive areas of law, except
in criminal litigation, and to a refusal to discourage the legal process by
allowing too much disclosure. Fourth, the lawyer's ethical concerns are
also recognized by allowing disclosure of misrepresentations when they
occur in the course of the lawyer's service to the client.123 The specific
conditions that release a lawyer from his obligation of loyalty to the
client affirm the lawyer's commitment to accuracy in the process by
120. See text accompanying notes 18-86 supra.
121. MODEL RULES FINAL DRAFT Rule 3.3(2)(4); MODEL RULES DISCUSSION DRAFT Rule
1.7(b). The Discussion Draft, however, permits disclosure of material facts to prevent harm from
deliberately wrongful acts, id. Rule 1.7(c)(2), and permits disclosure in adjudication. Id. 3.1(e). I
doubt, however, that the lawyer's inclination to exercise his discretion to disclose will often over-
come his sense of loyalty to the client.
It is interesting to speculate why the Discussion Draft does not permit disclosure of material
facts in negotiations, and why the Final Draft eliminates mandatory disclosure of prior falsehood
in negotiations. Do lawyers have a deeper commitment to rules applied in adjudication than to
the negotiating process? See text accompanying note 102 supra; J. SHKLAR, LEGALISM 1-2 (1964).
Are the drafters of the Model Rules office practitioners rather than trial counsel?
122. MODEL RULES FINAL DRAFT Rule 3.3(d); MODEL RULES DISCUSSION DRAFT Rule 3.5.
Disclosure of material facts is not required, however, just because the other side is unrepresented
or underrepresented. Perhaps the drafters hoped that lawyer competence would eliminate under-
representation, compare CODE Canon 6 with MODEL RULES FINAL DRAFT Rule 1.1 and MODEL
RULES DISCUSSION DRAFT Rule 1.1, and that wide availability of legal services would eliminate
lack of representation. Compare CODE EC 2-25 with MODEL RULES FINAL DRAFT Rule 6.1 and
MODEL RULES DISCUSSION DRAFT Rule 8.1. Moreover, mandating disclosure of material facts
might place an intolerable factfinding burden on the conscientious lawyer to define materiality,
thereby converting disclosure to a discretionary rule.
123. See notes 35 & 69 supra..
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which rules are made, because disclosure is allowed whether or not the
misrepresentations are innocently made.' 24
Each of these assumptions rests on empirical and moral judgments
about lawyering and the legal process, but the conclusion that law has
an autonomous life of its own probably rests on an additional judgment
about the institutional competence of those responsible for a profes-
sional code. The bar associations and courts that draft and adopt ethi-
cal rules are not unaware of the political uses of legal representation.
But they would become embroiled in controversies they could not re-
solve if they tried to draft rules accounting for this reality.
This does not mean that a professional code should be innocent of
the political implications of legal representation. It should, as the
Model Rules do,125 encourage wide dissemination of legal services to
balance as evenly as possible the ability of clients to make use of the
legal system. Any effort to go further, however, and adjust the client-
attorney relationship to account for political realities that vary with the
context in which legal disputes arise would stretch the capabilities of a
professional code beyond the breaking point. A professional code,
therefore, should contain confidentiality rules based on the assumption
that the law has a life of its own independent of political forces, and
that institutions other than those responsible for a professional code
should decide whether to adjust those rules to reflect the realities pre-
vailing in particular legal settings. The final section of this Article ex-
plains these limits on institutional competence by analyzing the ethical
problem of disclosure in tax disputes.
IV. Tax Disputes and Institutional Competence
The political implications of confidentiality rules are nowhere
more apparent than in disputes between the individual and the govern-
ment, of which tax disputes with the Internal Revenue Service are a
good example.126 A significant body of opinion holds that the relation-
124. By contrast, the American Lawyer's Code limits violation of loyalty to the client to situa-
tions in which lawyer action was knowingly induced by the client. See AMERICAN LAWYER'S
CODE § 6.5. This demonstrates concern that the lawyer not be tainted by fraudulent misrepresen-
tations. Even this concern is severely restricted, however, because the American Lawyer's Code
permits only withdrawal, and then only if explicit disclosure is not required. See note 60 supra.
125. MODEL RULES FINAL DRAFT Rule 6.1; MODEL RULES DISCUSSION DRAFT Rule 8.1.
126. The ABA has not adopted special ethical rules for tax practice, apparently with the sup-
port of the ABA Tax Section, Collie & Marinis, supra note 119, at 460 n.16, but the ABA Commit-
tee on Professional Ethics has issued ABA FORMAL OPINIONS No. 314 (1965), dealing with tax
practice, and ABA FORMAL OPINIONS No. 346 (1981), dealing with tax shelter opinions, and the
ABA Tax Section has suggested tax practice guidelines for adoption by law firms. ABA Section of
Taxation, Guidelines to Tax Practice, 31 TAx LAW. 551 (1978).
The Division of Federal Taxation of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
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ship between the individual and the government in tax disputes creates
a greater obligation of individual disclosure than is required in other
types of litigation. 127 The argument, in effect, is that the confidentiality
rules should take account of the balance of power between the dispu-
tants and tilt it toward the government. If a professional code should
not consider such factors, however, then the Model Rules should not
make any special provision for tax disputes, but should instead leave
the adoption of such provisions to other institutions. I will test this
hypothesis first by explaining how the Model Rules would address
some typical disclosure problems in tax practice,128 and then by consid-
(AICPA) has published Statements on Responsibilities in Tax Practice, which serve an advisory,
educational function but which do not have the force of authority of the AICPA's Code of Profes-
sional Ethics. AICPA Div. of Fed. Taxation, Statements on Responsibilities in Tax Practice: Intro-
duction, 127 J. ACcT. 60,61 (1969). See also AICPA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Rule 102, at
18 (1975) ("In tax practice, a member may resolve doubt in favor of his client as long as there is
reasonable support for his position.").
The Treasury Department imposes obligations on those practicing before the Internal Reve-
nue Service. See 31 U.S.C. § 1026 (1976). Tax return preparation is not "practice," but those
practicing before the agency must adhere to rules about return preparation. See 31 C.F.R.
§§ 10.2(a), .22(a) (1980). Congress also has imposed obligations on income tax preparers, I.R.C.
§§ 6694, 6695, but advice from lawyers usually will not amount to return preparation. Id.
§ 7701(a)(36); Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-15(a)(2), (b)(l) (1977).
A collection of articles on professional ethics in tax practice appears in PROFESSIONAL RE-
SPONSIBILITY IN FEDERAL TAX PRACTICE (B. Bittker ed. 1970). [hereinafter cited as BITrKER].
More recent articles are Corneel, Ethical Guidelines for Tax Practice, 28 TAX L. Rpv. 1 (1972);
Rowen, When May a Lawyer Advise a Client that He May Take a Position on His Tax Return?, 29
TAx LAW. 237 (1976); Saltzman, Ethical Rules of Conduct for Tax Practitioners: Where Do We
Now Stand?, 41 J. TAX. 162 (1974); Sellin, Professional Responsibility of the Tax Practitioner, 52
TAXES 584 (1974).
127. Darrell, supra note 100, at 91; Hellerstein, Ethical Problems in Office Counselling, 8 TAX.
L. REv. 4, 9 (1952); Paul, The Responsibilities of the Tax Adviser, 63 HARV. L. REv. 377, 384
(1950). Put see Johnson, Does the Tax Practitioner Owe a Dual Responsibility to his Client and to
the Government?-he Theory, 15 S. CAL. TAX INST. 25 (1963); Paul, supra note 100, at 428-29.
One must be cautious in interpreting broad statements favoring disclosure, because the specific
application of general principles may turn out to be less controversial than the rhetoric surround-
ing them. See, e.g., Tarleau, Ethical Problems in Dealing with Treasury Representatives, 8 TAX L.
REv. 10, 10-11 (1952), discussed in Paul, The Lawyer as a Tax Adviser, supra note 100, at 426
(client error on dispositive facts known to lawyer representing client).
128. A threshold problem under the Model Rules is whether nonadversary decisionmaking at
the administrative level is adjudication or negotiation. The nonadversary process is one in which
a tribunal applies legal rules but there is only one party to the dispute. The tribunal is expected to
investigate the facts and apply the law without the help of an opposing party, but unlike ex parte
proceedings, the tribunal usually has the time and resources to make an independent investiga-
tion. Some features of nonadversary proceedings make the relationship between the individual
and the tribunal similar to negotiations, but other features resemble adjudication. A Comment to
the Discussion Draft defines negotiation to include not only contract negotiations, but also negoti-
ations to settle litigation and to determine what action will be taken by government regulatory
agencies. MODEL RULES DISCUSSION DRAFT Rule 4, Comment, at 20. Nonadversary adjudica-
tion might therefore be considered negotiations under the Model Rules because settlement is
sometimes possible, as in tax cases, 5 INT. RE. MANUAL-AD. (CCH) 11 8711-23 (1980), and
because the hearings determine what the agency's position will be.
However, the differences between nonadversary adjudication and negotiations are greater
than the similarities. In many settlement negotiations and in discussions with government regula-
tors, legal rules are no more than the background against which the parties adjust relationships
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ering who is competent to adopt special confidentiality rules in tax
disputes.'2 9
A. Particular Fact Situations
1. False Claim on Audit.-A lawyer represents a client who has
claimed a deduction for expenses of a two week trip to Europe. After
the audit begins, the lawyer discovers that the client spent one of the
two weeks on vacation. The law requires an allocation between de-
ductible business and nondeductible personal expenses. 30 The govern-
ment is challenging the deduction on different grounds, however,
arguing that the deduction is improper because of the small amount of
time spent on business each day. The government is unaware that one-
half of the days were spent on vacation.
Under the Model Rules, the lawyer's obligation to a tribunal pro-
hibits his filing a claim unless there is a reasonable basis for doing
So.131 If a misrepresentation occurs while the lawyer is representing the
determined by political and economic as well as by legal considerations. In nonadversary adjudi-
cation, however, legal rules determine the outcome. Settlement, where possible, is influenced only
by the strengths and weaknesses of the party's legal position, and the hearing is meant to result in
application of the law. Sometimes the hearing is the only way the individual can get a decision
applying the law to the facts of the case, see 5 U.S.C. § 8128(b) (1976) (government employee
benefits), and, in any event, the tribunals findings of fact are frequently very influential in subse-
quent judicial review. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1976) (social security). In tax litigation, the tax-
payer usually has the burden of proof on findings made by the government at the administrative
hearing level. M. GARDIS & R. FROME, PROCEDURES IN FEDERAL TAX CONTROVERSIES, 8-4 to -
6, 12-16 to -22 (1968). Analysis of the lawyer's role in nonadversary adjudication is therefore best
begun on the assumption that the lawyer is engaging in advocacy in an adjudicatory setting rather
than in negotiations.
129. The following discussion is not concerned with whether disclosure might be required for
non-ethical reasons. However, reasons for disclosure not embodied in a code of ethics may exist.
First, disclosure might prevent imposition of fraud or negligence penalties against the taxpayer.
ABA FORMAL OPINIONs No. 314, at 691 (1967); AICPA Div. of Fed. Taxation, Statement on
Responsibilities in Tax Practice-Positions Contrary to Treasury Defpartment or Internal Revenue
Service Interpretations of the Code, 144 J. AccT. §§ .08, .12, at 103-04 (1977). BITTKER, supra note
126, at 251.
Second, disclosure might preserve the lawyer's reputation with the agency, which would
prove valuable in other cases. Collie & Marinis, supra note 119, at 464; Darrell, supra note 100, at
98; Tarleau, supra note 127, at 13; What is Good Tax Practice: A Panel Discussion, 21 N.Y.U.
INST. FED. TAX. 23, 29 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Panel Discussion]. However, the lawyer should
not violate a client's confidence in order to enhance his reputation and reap financial gain in
future cases. Admittedly, the lawyer's favorable reputation may ease the agency's investigative
burden if it can be relied on to vouch for the client's claim. See Br=rKER, supra note 126, at 249-
50; Paul, supra note 100, at 423. Requiring disclosure to enhance that reputation, however, begs
the question because the pivotal issue in determining disclosure rules is the extent to which the
lawyer should be required to assist the agency's investigation.
130. I.R.C. § 274(c).
131. MODEL RULES FINAL DRAFT Rule 3.1. The Discussion Draft required that the lawyer
believe that good grounds supported the claim. MODEL RULES DISCUSSION DRA-r Rule
3.1(a)(1).
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client, the lawyer must disclose the true facts if the client will not.132 In
the context of a tax audit,133 this means that the lawyer cannot argue
that an entire expenditure was a deductible travel expense when he
knows that a portion was a nondeductible vacation expense; if the law-
yer innocently makes this argument, he must upon discovering his error
disclose the facts necessary to correct any prior misrepresentation.
Even without establishing a greater obligation of disclosure in tax dis-
putes, therefore, the Model Rules require disclosure in this type of
situation. 134
The Model Rules do not explain how a lawyer should deal with a
tax obligation unrelated to the claim that is the subject of litigation.
For example, suppose that the taxpayer clearly owes tax because en-
tertainment expenses are overstated, but the government's audit is lim-
132. MODEL RULES FINAL DRAFT Rule 3.3(a)(4).
133. Disclosure rules apply to a lawyer's appearance before a "tribunal." Id. Rule 3.3. The
Code defined "tribunal" to include all adjudicatory bodies, not just courts. CODE Definitions, No.
6. The Model Rules do not contain this definition, but the omission should not narrow the defini-
tion of a tribunal.
134. Existing rules do not allow the lawyer knowingly to advance a claim for which there is no
reasonable support, CODE DR 7-102(a)(2), but there is no obligation to disclose facts if the lawyer
discovers that the claim is false. The lawyer must counsel the client to make disclosure, ABA
FORMAL OPINIONS No. 314 (1965); 31 C.F.R. § 10.21 (1980), but the client's refusal to disclose can
result only in the lawyer's withdrawal. Furthermore, the lawyer may withdraw only if nonwith-
drawal amounts to corroboration of the false claim by the lawyer and if withdrawal would not
disclose the confidence. ABA FORMAL OPINIONS No. 314 (1965). The ABA Tax Section's Guide-
lines to Tax Practice, supra note 126, are ambiguous. At one point they say that withdrawal is
required if the client has lied, id. at 554, and later state that withdrawal is "normally" required
only if the client has affirmatively misled the IRS. Id. Apparently, under the Guidelines, the
lawyer's corroboration of a misrepresentation is not necessary for withdrawal, nor is the possibility
that withdrawal would amount to disclosure a bar to withdrawal. Corroboration is, however, a
sufficient reason for withdrawal. Id.
The rules for certified public accountants (CPAs) appear to be substantially the same as those
set forth in ABA FORMAL OPINIONs No. 314 (1965). AICPA Div. of Fed. Taxation, "Statement on
Responsibilities in Tax Practice No. 7 Knowledge f/Error: Administrative Proceedings," 130 J.
AccT. §§ II, III(B), at 66-67 (1970). The only difference is that withdrawal by a CPA depends on
the existence of a material understatement of tax liability. Id. § I, at 66. The similarity in the
obligation of lawyers and CPAs belies the claim that accountants are more prone to disclosure
because of their tradition as independent auditors. See Collie & Marinis, supra note 119, at 464-
66; Johnson, supra note 127, at 34-35; Panel Discussion, supra note 129, at 27-28. But see Graves,
Responsibility fthe Tax Adviser, in BrrrKEt, supra note 126, at 152. There may still be differ-
ences between the disclosure obligations of accountants and lawyers. See notes 139 & 145 infra.
If the Model Rules are adopted, lawyers will have greater disclosure obligations than ac-
countants. Greater obligations on lawyers did not, however, bother the drafters of the Model
Rules in the lobbying context. See note 119 supra. At present, accountants are encountering
greater obligations to disclose their workpapers, because only lawyers' workpapers are privileged.
Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981). Compare United States. v. Arthur Young &
Co., 496 F. Supp. 1152 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) and United States v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 474 F. Supp.
322 (D. Mass. 1979), appeal dismissed without opinion, 612 F.2d 569 (1st Cir. 1979) with United
States v. Coopers & Lybrand, 413 F. Supp. 942 (D. Colo. 1975), a/I'd, 550 F.2d 615 (10th Cir.
1977).
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ited to disputed travel expenses. A number of commentators135 have
argued that the claim in dispute is the entire tax obligation, not the
issue that is the subject of attention. In this view, denial of an obliga-
tion to pay disputed travel expenses is in effect a denial that'any taxes
are due, at least for that year. Professor Bittker has suggested that a
broad obligation of disclosure in this situation would not impose differ-
ent obligations in tax cases than in other disputes. He analogizes this
situation to a lawsuit in which a client who sues for nonpayment after
delivery of goods fails to reveal that the goods have not been delivered,
when the only defense raised by the defendant is that the goods are
defective.136
This analogy does not seem particularly apt, however. A suit for
payment after delivery of goods necessarily asserts that the goods have
been delivered. The more apt analogy is to ask whether a lawyer repre-
senting a plaintiff suing for the purchase price of delivered goods must
disclose that his client owes the defendant an unrelated debt, even
though the defendant has not asserted the debt as a set-off. As long as
the lawyer is not required to reveal wrongful acts generally, he should
not be required to disclose an error unrelated to the issue in dispute. 137
Determining what constitutes a "related" issue will admittedly be
difficult in some cases.1 38 Arguably, the government's claim that the
time spent each day on business was negligible is not the same as
claiming that some days were spent on exclusively personal pursuits.
However, implicit in the lawyer's defending against the government's
claim that the time spent each day on business was negligible is the
assertion that at least some business transpired daily. The lawyer is not
similarly tainted with an assertion of a falsehood if he remains silent
about an improper deduction of entertainment expenses not raised by
the government auditor. 39
135. BrrrKR, supra note 126, at 268-69. See also Darrell, supra note 100, at 137, 139-40.
Contra, Corneel, supra note 126, at 24.
136. BrrrKER, supra note 126, at 269.
137. A distinction might be made between defending against a government claim and filing
for a refund. The more assertive posture of a refund claim may create greater disclosure obliga-
tions, especially given the practice of delaying refund claims until the statute of limitations has
almost run on assessments. Cf. I.R.C. § 131 1(b)(1) (correction of error in a year otherwise closed
by statute of limitations only when a party is actively pressing a claim inconsistent with a position
taken in a closed year).
138. Consider the following: (1) the government asserts that an expense is personal, not busi-
ness, and the lawyer knows that it is a nondeductible capital expenditure; (2) the government
asserts a loss is personal, and the lawyer knows that the loss occurred on a sale to a related party
defined in I.R.C. § 267(b).
139. Disclosure rules for CPAs may be stricter. They require disclosure of any patent error on
a return of which any part is the subject of a proceeding before the IRS. AICPA Div. of Fed.
Taxation, supra note 134, § III(B), at 66. The AICPA suggests that the CPA should determine
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2. Revealing Facts on Audit.-The government audits a client's
tax return and argues that an alleged business trip to Europe was for
personal purposes. The lawyer is aware that the taxpayer visited rela-
tives during the trip, a relevant but not dispositive fact that tends to
show that the visit was personal.
Under the Final Draft of the Model Rules, the lawyer is not per-
mitted to disclose material facts in this context. 14° Unless there is a
greater obligation to disclose in tax disputes,' 41 the lawyer is under no
obligation to disclose material facts tending to support the govern-
ment's position.142
3. Misrepresentations by the Client on Audit.-When the govern-
ment alleges that a business trip to Europe was for personal purposes,
the client denies having visited relatives there. The lawyer knows that
the facts are otherwise.
The Model Rules require the disclosure of all facts, whether dis-
positive or not,143 if they are misrepresented by the client in the course
of the lawyer's representation. 44 The Model Rules, therefore, require
disclosure even if there is no greater disclosure obligation in tax
disputes. 145
whether he could have signed the return if the patent error had been known at the time of return
preparation. The dominant role of CPAs as return preparers may furnish an appropriate analogy
for their role in the audit process.
140. See text accompanying notes 61-65 supra.
141. Favoring such disclosure are Darrell, supra note 100, at 93; Hellerstein, supra note 127, at
9; and Paul, supra note 127, at 384. Professor Paul has doubts, however. Id. at 425, 427, 429.
Professor Bittker opposes disclosure of material facts. BiTTKER, supra note 126, at 253-55, 270-71.
142. Current rules forbid disclosure in this situation. ABA FORMAL OPINIONS No. 314 (1965).
See also ABA Section of Taxation, supra note 126, at 554.
143. See MODEL RULES FINAL DRAFT Rule 3.3(a)(4), (b); MODEL RULEs DIscussiON DRAFT
Rule 3.1(b). Materiality of the facts is probably required. See note 57 supra.
144. In tax litigation, there is a real possibility that the lawyer will first become involved at an
appeal stage after misrepresentation has occurred at an earlier stage of the dispute. The lawyer's
later involvement, however, should taint the lawyer with misrepresentations made at any point in
the adjudicative process. Cf. MODEL RULES DIsCUSSION DRAFT Rule 4.2(b)(2) (lawyer must cor-
rect manifest misapprehension created by client in negotiations, even if the lawyer was not in-
volved with the client at the time of the misrepresentation). But see Note, supra note 38, at 89 n.1,
106.
145. Current rules require withdrawal--not disclosure-if failure to withdraw would corrobo-
rate a misrepresentation, unless withdrawal itself would disclose a confidence. ABA FORMAL
OPINIONs No. 314 (1965).
The AICPA rules seem concerned only with errors resulting in material understatements of
tax liability, rather than misrepresentations of material facts. This distinction might reflect the
accountant's interest in the bottom line compared to the lawyer's interest in the factfinding proc-
ess. AICPA Div. of Fed. Taxation, supra note 134, § I, at 66. But see AICPA Comm. on Fed.
Taxation, "Statements on Responsibilities in Tax Practice No. 3. Answers to Questions on Returns,"
122 J. AccT. § III, at 60-61 (1966) (all questions on a return must be answered unless there are
reasonable grounds for omission, which grounds must be explained on the return).
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4. False Tax Returns and Revealing Facts on a Tax Return.-
When a lawyer prepares a tax return, he may face the same issues that
arise in proceedings before a tribunal: false claims, misrepresentations,
and disclosure of material facts. The Model Rules prohibit a lawyer
from knowingly advancing a false claim or knowingly making a mis-
representation in a return, but they do not require disclosure of mate-
rial facts in the return. 146 What should the lawyer do if he discovers
that the client has made a false claim or misrepresentation in a tax
return? Must the lawyer disclose that fact, and does the answer to that
question depend on whether the lawyer prepared the return or whether
the lawyer is now representing the taxpayer on audit?
The principles already discussed essentially provide the answers to
these questions. If the lawyer did not prepare the return and an audit
has not begun, the question becomes whether the lawyer must disclose
a client's prior wrongful act. The Model Rules permit disclosure only
to rectify the consequences of a fraudulent act when the lawyer's serv-
ices have been used in the commission of that act.' 47 If the lawyer
participates in an audit of the return, the Model Rules require disclo-
sure of any false claim or misrepresentation made in the course of the
lawyer's representation in the audit, whether or not deliberately wrong-
ful and whether or not the lawyer prepared the return.' 48
These questions also raise a new issue: whether a lawyer's prepa-
ration of the return imposes a disclosure obligation under the Model
Rules if the lawyer does not represent the taxpayer on audit. The Rules
require disclosure only if the return is considered the presentation of
evidence to a tribunal. 149 Otherwise, the error is a prior wrongful act,
and the Rules permit disclosure only if the client's act was fraudu-
146. MODEL RULES FINAL DRAFT Rule 3.1; MODEL RULES DISCUSSION DRAFT Rule
3.1(a)(l). The same rules apply under the Code. See ABA FORMAL OPINIONS No. 314 (1965).
147. MODEL RULES FINAL DRAFT Rule 1.6(b)(3). The Final Draft also permits disclosure to
prevent a fraudulent act likely to result in substantial injury to another's financial interests, id.
Rule 1.6(a)(2), but the example in the text specifies that the act has already been performed. The
Discussion Draft differed by permitting disclosure to rectify the consequences of a deliberately
wrongful act. MODEL RULES DISCUSSION DRAFT Rule 1.7(c)(2). Under the Code, disclosure was
not permitted even if the error was deliberate. ABA FORMAL OPINIONS No. 314 (1965). The prior
error is probably not a continuing crime. Compare Darrell, supra note 100, at 91 with Callan &
David, supra note 25, at 348.
148. MODEL RULES FINAL DRAFT Rule 3.3(a)(3); MODEL RULES DISCUSSION DRAFT Rule
3.1(b). See also note 144 supra. Such disclosure is prohibited by the Code. ABA FORMAL OPIN-
IONS No. 314 (1965).
149. Compare Darrell, supra note 100, at 93 (preparation of return is certification by the
preparer resulting in a higher disclosure obligation) with Graves, supra note 134, at 158. See also
Tarleau, supra note 127, at 13-14 (suggesting that the lawyer must disclose errors if the lawyer
prepared the return and represents the taxpayer on audit).
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lent.' 50 Characterizing a tax return as evidence presented to a tribunal
seems farfetched, however. The last thing the taxpayer wants is to be-
gin a dispute requiring resolution by adjudication. The return is best
characterized as the culmination of the advice that the lawyer gave to
the client.' 5' The exception to this characterization is a refund claim.
Such claims, by which the taxpayer affirmatively seeks a determination
that the government owes him money, are analogous to commence-
ment of litigation before a tribunal. The Model Rules should be read
to require disclosure of false claims and misrepresentations presented
in a refund claim prepared by the lawyer if the lawyer subsequently
discovers an error.
B. How Much Disclosure, and Who Should Decide?
The foregoing discussion can be summarized as follows: Although
they expand disclosure, the Model Rules do not clearly require disclo-
sure in several important situations likely to arise in tax disputes. They
do not require disclosure of material facts unless a misrepresentation
has occurred in the course of an audit in which the lawyer has partici-
pated; they do not clearly require disclosure of tax obligations unre-
lated to the specific issues raised on audit; and they do not clearly
require disclosure of false claims or misrepresentations in the absence
of an audit when the lawyer has prepared the return. After examining
the Model Rules, then, one might argue that lawyers should have
greater disclosure obligations in tax disputes than the Rules require.
The argument for a greater disclosure obligation rests on three fea-
tures of tax disputes. First, the individual's obligation to pay taxes is a
special obligation, 152 especially given the importance of citizen honesty
in dealing with the government. 53 Second, the volume of returns com-
pared to the small percentage audited 5 4 makes our tax system depend-
150. MODEL RULES FINAL DRAFT Rule 6(b)(3).
151. See BITrKER, supra note 126, at 254. But see Sax, Lawyer Responsibility in Tax Shelter
Opinions, 34 TAX LAW. 5, 37, 44 (1980) (distinguishing advice from claiming a position on a
return). AICPA rules makes no distinction based on whether or not the CPA prepared the return
containing an error. AICPA Div. of Fed. Taxation, "Statement on Responsibilities in Tax Practice
No. 6 Knowledge of Error: Return Preparation," 130 J. Acr. §§ I, H, III(B)(1), at 65 (1970).
If preparation of the return taints the lawyer, contrary to the position taken here, the question
remains whether advice on a matter that is relevant to an item appearing on a return taints the
lawyer or whether the taint occurs only if the lawyer is the return "preparer." Few lawyers will be
"preparers" under the regulations. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-15(a)(2), (b) (1977). In my view, it
is the lawyer's participation in the advice leading to the presence or absence of the return item that
associates the lawyer with that item and produces whatever disclosure obligation ensues.
152. See note 127 supra.153. Paul, TheResponsibilities of the TaxAdviser, supra note 127, at 384; Paul, The Lawyer asa
Tax Adpiser, supra note I00, at 422.
154. Paul, supra note 100, at 423-24; Rowen, supra note 126, at 249.
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ent upon taxpayer cooperation, 55 especially in view of the taxpayer's
control over the facts. 156 Third, government officials who decide dis-
putes are presumably impartial, not adversarial, and allowing taxpay-
ers to play by the adversary rules157 gives them an unfair advantage.
The opposing view, adopted by an ABA opinion, is that the gov-
ernment is not unbiased. 5 8 Furthermore, if the government needs
facts, it can and does ask for them.159 Any special obligation to pay
taxes must therefore yield, just as it does in most adjudication, to the
need to protect the individual client.160
Whatever the merits of the claim that taxes are a special obliga-
tion,161 the issue is how to adjust the balance of investigative power
between the individual and the agency. We must ask who has an ad-
vantage in the struggle between the litigants and whether confidential-
ity rules should be modified to compensate for any such advantage.
The political nature of these questions in the tax context becomes more
clear by asking similar questions in the welfare adjudication context.
Assume, for example, that the lawyer represents a welfare client who
claims that the father of her child has left home and that the family is
therefore eligible for Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC),162 or that the lawyer's client argues that she is eligible for
disability benefits because she is totally unable to work.' 63 Must the
lawyer reveal that the father visited the AFDC claimant in her home
for two days after the beginning of the father's alleged "continued ab-
sence," or that the disabled individual worked for two days after the
alleged onset of disability at another job? Neither fact is dispositive, 64
155. Janel Discussion, supra note 129, at 25. But see Johnson, supra note 127, at 30-31 (client
trust in tax adviser encourages cooperation by taxpayer with government).
156. Paul, supra note 100, at 423; Panel Discussion, supra note 129, at 25.
157. I tNT. REv. MANUAL-AUDrr (CCH) pt. 4231, at § 120(3) (Apr. 23, 1981). See also Rev.
Proc. 64-22, 1964-1 C.B. 689.
158. ABA FORMAL OPINIONS No. 314, at 689 (1965). See also Collie & Marinis, supra note
156, at 459; Paul, supra note 100, at 429-30; Panel Discussion, supra note 129, at 58-59.
159. BIrrR, supra note 126, at 252-53, 255 (on tax return); Simmons, The "Eleven Ques-
tions"-4n Extraordinary NewAudit Technique, 30 TAx LAW. 23 (1976) (on audit); Panel Discus-
sion, supra note 129, at 47-48 (on tax return). But see Rowen, supra note 126, at 260-62.
160. BrrrER, supra note 126, at 268 (shadow of Big Brother implicit in argument that the
Treasury represents all of us); id. at 270 (legal assistance of adviser preserves democratic society).
161. I have argued elsewhere that such an obligation exists, based on the special significance
of paying taxes in defining membership in a political community. Popkin, Standing to Challenge
Generous Tax Rulings, 6 TAX NoTEs, 163, 168 (1978).
162. 42 U.S.C. § 606(a) (1976) ("continued absence" of parent from home).
163. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A) (1976) ("inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity").
164. It is not clear that "continued absence" requires physical absence at all times, see Turn-
bow v. Mitchell, 10 CLEARIMNHOUSE REV. 999 (1977), or that disability is negated by sporadic
work, especially work performed for a relative. See Prevette v. Richardson, 316 F. Supp. 144, 147
(D.S.C. 1970).
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but each is relevant to the government's disposition of the claim. Must
the lawyer reveal a clear overpayment of AFDC or disability benefits
made prior to the date on which the new claim would be effective, or is
the lawyer's obligation limited to the facts and issues relevant to the
new claim?
The answers to these questions depend on one's view of the impar-
tiality of the hearing officers in income maintenance disputes, of the
importance of professional loyalty for arguably defenseless welfare
claimants, and, more generally, of how the power struggle between in-
come maintenance claimants and the government should turn out. Af-
ter considering these factors, one might favor greater disclosure than
that required by a nonpoliticized professional code drafted on the as-
sumption that litigants are more or less equally balanced. Similarly,
the desirable amount of disclosure in tax disputes might differ depend-
ing on whether one viewed taxpayers as innocents set upon by the gov-
ernment or as schemers who take advantage of the government. The
generally strong reactions that people have to the image of a welfare or
tax cheater suggests how political these judgments are in both the wel-
fare and tax contexts.
Given the political nature of these issues, it seems doubtful that
either the bar or highest court of the state has the procedures or insight
to draft specialized confidentiality rules. Their concerns will likely dif-
fer from the government's in tax matters because of their members'
social backgrounds and client orientation, and because those organiza-
tions are unlikely to hold hearings exposing them to the government's
concerns. In welfare cases, the organized bar and the government are
likely to share a bias against recipients. Confidentiality rules should
rest, therefore, on an assumption that the law is a product of more or
less balanced political pressures. More politically sensitive institutions
should be responsible for deciding whether or not the generally appli-
cable confidentiality rules should apply in specialized areas. 165
At present, neither Congress nor the Department of Treasury, in-
stitutions that presumably are politically sensitive, has shown much in-
terest in controlling tax advisers, much less in dealing with the problem
of disclosure. Congress recently imposed penalties for negligent or
willful understatement of taxes, 166 and the Treasury proposed regula-
165. The risk is not only that the political judgments will be misinformed, but also that they
may be biased. Some evidence suggests that the securities bar played a significant role in urging
the 1974 Code amendments limiting disclosure. Note, supra note 38, at 102 n.53.
166. I.R.C. § 6694. The regulations allow the preparer to rely on facts provided by the client
unless they appear incorrect or incomplete, or unless the Code explicitly requires further support
to justify a deduction. Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-I(b)(2)(ii) (1978).
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tions controlling tax shelter advice expected to be disseminated to non-
client investors. 67 These regulations concern disclosure to a limited
extent by requiring the tax shelter opinion to disclose all facts "which
bear significantly on each important Federal tax aspect" of the transac-
tion. 68 Their major thrust, however, lies in requiring the lawyer to
exercise due diligence in determining relevant facts, 169 to state the
likely outcome of the transaction, 170 and to issue the opinion only if the
bulk of the advantages are more likely than not to be allowable. 17'
Outside of the tax shelter area, the Treasury imposes no greater disclo-
sure obligations than does the Code of Professional Responsibility. 72
Whether greater disclosure could be required by the Treasury
without legislative sanction, 73 analogously to the rules recently im-
posed by the SEC, 174 or only with legislative approval, as the ABA has
argued with respect to the SEC rules, 75 depends on how dramatically
the proposal departs from generally accepted rules. In the tax context,
for example, the more dramatic step of requiring disclosure of relevant
167. 45 Fed. Reg. 58,594 (1980) (to be codified in 31 C.F.R. § 10.33). See also Rev. Rul. 80-
265, 1980-14 I.R.B. at 19; Rev. Rul. 80-266, 1980-14 I.R.B. at 20.
The drafters of the Model Rules were sensitive to the problem of opinions disseminated to
nonclients, but ultimately concluded that no special disclosure requirements should be imposed
where disclosure is not required by law. MODEL RULES FINAL DRAFT Rule 2.3(a)(2-3), (c) &
Comment, at 117. See also ABA FORMAL OPINIONS No. 346 (1981).
168. 45 Fed. Reg. 58,594, at 58,597 (1980) (to be codified in 31 C.F.R. § 10.33(a)(1)(i)).
169. 45 Fed. Reg. 58,594, at 58,597. Value, for example, would have to be verified. Id. at
58,596. At present, the lawyer need not investigate facts provided by the client, at least in the
absence of apparent error or inconsistency. See ABA Section of Taxation, supra note 126, at 553.
170. 45 Fed. Reg. 58,594, at 58,597 (to be codified in 31 C.F.R. § 10.33(a)(1)(ii)).
171. 45 Fed. Reg. 58,594, at 58,597 (to be codified in 31 C.F.R. § 10.33(a)(2)). Under current
rules, an opinion could be issued if the lawyer believes that there is reasonable support for the
opinion. Id. at 58,595.
172. Lawyers engaged in practice before the Treasury must call upon clients to correct errors,
31 C.F.R. § 10.21 (1980), but are not required to disclose privileged information. Id. § 10.20(a).
The lawyer must use due diligence in preparing a return, id. § 10.22, but it is unlikely that this
requires much checking up on facts provided by the client. See BITTKER, supra note 126, at 247;
ABA Section of Taxation, supra note 126, at 553.
The rules applicable to CPAs are no stricter. AICPA Div. of Fed. Taxation, Statement on
Responsibilities in Tax Practice No. 9: Certain Procedural Aspects of Preparing Returns, 135 J.
AccT. §§ II, III, at 71-72 (1973) (ordinarily CPA can rely on client's information unless it appears
incorrect or incomplete; CPA should not modify the preparers declaration to reveal reliance on
client's facts because tax return differs from financial statement).
173. See Maguire, Conscience and Propriety in Lawyer's Tax Practice, 13 TAx L. REv. 27, 47-
48 (1957).
174. See Bloomenthal, Lawyers, Professional Responsibility, the ABA and the SEC, 1 SEC. &
FED. CoRe. L. REP. 81 (1979). The Model Rules do not require lawyers to disclose information to
prospective shareholders of a client corporation, preferring to leave such requirements to substan-
tive law rather than professional ethics. MODEL RULES FINAL DRAFT Rule 2.3 & Comment at
117. See also ABA FORMAL OPINIONS No. 335, at 2 n. I (1974) (greater than normal obligation of
securities lawyer to verify facts provided by client based on nonmandatory ethical considerations,
not mandatory disciplinary rules).
175. Lawyers, Clients, and Securities Laws, 61 A.B.A. J. 1085, 1085-86 (1975).
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facts in the absence of a misrepresentation might require legislative ap-
proval. 76 The Treasury might, however, impose a more modest re-
quirement to disclose prior misrepresentations made in a return
prepared by a lawyer 177 and tax obligations known to the lawyer but
unrelated to the issues specifically in dispute.' 78 Agency rules might
also deal with highly specialized problems, as in the tax shelter advice
proposals. 179 The important point is that those drafting a professional
code should not be responsible for adjusting the code to fit the myriad
political considerations affecting confidentiality rules in specific areas
of practice.
V. Conclusion
Both the Discussion Draft and the Final Draft of the Model Rules
represent a shift toward greater disclosure of client confidences by law-
yers. The Final Draft, however, would effect a more modest shift than
the Discussion Draft. Whether society's image of the lawyer and the
lawyer's self-image will support this change remains to be seen. In any
event, the Model Rules recognize an inevitable fact: the disintegration
of legal roles into a variety of functions peformed in a variety of institu-
tional environments. Recognition of the political considerations rele-
vant to confidentiality rules, however, is beyond the competence of any
code's drafters. Modern legal practice is likely to lead us beyond a gen-
erally applicable professional code to a proliferation of standards that
apply only to specialized areas of practice, but the legislatures and
agencies with rulemaking authority should be responsible for imposing
such standards.
176. See notes 140-42 supra & accompanying text.
177. See notes 149-51 supra & accompanying text.
178. See notes 147-48 supra & accompanying text.
179. See notes 167-71 supra & accompanying text. These proposals are criticized in Sax,
supra note 151, at 39-46.
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